We investigate the general problem of function release under differential privacy. First we develop a mechanism leveraging the iterated Bernstein operator for polynomial approximation of the target function, followed by coefficient perturbation. We then prove ε-differential privacy using access to the target's sensitivity and function evaluation only-admitting treatment of functions described explicitly or implicitly. Moreover, under weak regularity conditions-either Hölder continuity or bounded derivatives-we establish fast rates on utility measured by high-probability uniform approximation. We provide lower bounds on the utility achievable for any functional mechanism that is ε-differentially private. The generality of our mechanism is demonstrated by the analysis of a number of example learners, including nonparametric estimators and regularized empirical risk minimization. Competitive rates are demonstrated for kernel density estimation; and ε-differential privacy is achieved for a broader class of support vector machines than known previously.
Introduction
A major challenge in statistics and machine learning is balancing the conflicting objectives of releasing accurate data analyses while protecting data privacy. A U.S. hospital running an effective clinical trial must still guarantee patient privacy as demanded by HIPAA laws; while a media-streaming service's recommendations that drive user engagement, should respect user privacy for risk of litigation. In recent years, differential privacy [10] has emerged as the standard paradigm for privacy-preserving statistical analysis. It provides formal guarantees that aggregate statistics output by a randomized mechanism are not significantly influenced by the presence or absence of an individual input datum.
In this paper, we aim to privately release functions that depend on privacy-sensitive training data, that can be subsequently evaluated on arbitrary test points. This non-interactive setting matches a wide variety of machine learning tasks such as non-parametric methods (kernel density estimation and regression) where the function of train and test data is explicit, to generalized linear models and support vector machines where the function is only implicitly defined by an algorithm. We develop a mechanism that addresses this goal, and is based on functional approximation by Bernstein basis polynomials, specifically via an iterated Bernstein operator. Privacy is guaranteed by sanitizing the coefficients of approximation, which requires only function evaluation. As a result, our mechanism applies to releasing explicitly and implicitly defined functions. Our technique can be regarded as a function-valued version of the popular Laplace mechanism [10] , which generically privatizes vector-valued mappings assuming the same oracle access to function evaluation and sensitivity.
Polynomial approximation has proven useful in differential privacy settings outside function release [22, 4] . Towards the goal of private function release, few previous attempts have been made [24, 11] . Hall et al. [11] add Gaussian process noise which only yields a weaker form of privacy, namely (ε, δ)-differential privacy, and does not admit general utility rates. Zhang et al. [24] introduce a functional mechanism for the more specific task of perturbing the objective in private optimization, but they assume separability in the training data and do not obtain rates on utility.
The Bernstein polynomials central to our mechanism are used in the Stone-Weierstrass theorem to uniformly approximate any continuous function on a closed interval; moreover, the Bernstein operator yields approximations that are pointwise convex combinations of the function evaluations on a cover. As a result, performing privacy-preserving perturbations to the approximation's coefficients, permit us to control utility and achieve fast convergence rates.
Wang et al. [23] propose a mechanism that releases a summary of data in a trigonometric basis, able to respond to subsequent queries that are smooth as in our setting, but are in addition required to be separable in the training dataset as in [24] . A natural application is kernel density estimation, which would achieve a rate of O (log(1/β)/(nε)) h/( +h) as does our approach. Private KDE has also been explored in various other settings [9] and under weaker notions of utility [11] .
As an example of an implicitly defined function, we consider regularized empirical risk minimization such as logistic regression, ridge regression, and the SVM. Previous mechanisms for private SVM release and ERM more generally [21, 7, 13, 12, 1] require finite-dimensional feature mapping or translation-invariant kernels. Hall et al. [11] consider more general mappings but provide (ε, δ)differential privacy. Our treatment of regularized ERM extends to kernels that may be translationvariant with infinite-dimensional mappings, while providing stronger privacy guarantees.
Finally, we provide a lower bound that fundamentally limits utility under private function release, partly resolving a question posed by Hall et al. [11] . This matches (up to logarithmic factors) our upper bound in the linear case.
Preliminaries
Problem setting. In this work, we consider X an arbitrary (possibly infinite) domain and D ∈ X n a database consisting of n points in X . We refer to n as the size of the database D. For a positive integer , let Y = [0, 1] be a set of query points and F : X n × Y → R the function we aim to release. Once the database D is fixed, we denote by F D = F (D, ·) the function parametrized by D. For example, D might represent a training set-over X a product space of feature vectors and labels-with Y representing test points from the same feature space. In Section 3, we show how to privately release the function F D and we provide alternative error bounds depending on regularity of F .
we refer to f as L-Lipschitz. Definition 2. Let h be a positive integer and T > 0. A function f : 1] ) and its partial derivatives up to order h are all bounded by T .
Our goal is to develop a private release mechanism for the function F D in the non-interactive setting. A non-interactive mechanism takes a function F and a database D as inputs and outputs a synopsis A which can be used to evaluate the function F D on Y without accessing the database D further.
Differential privacy. To provide strong privacy guarantees on the release of F D , we adopt the well-established notion of differential privacy. Definition 3 ([10]). Let R be a (possibly infinite) set of responses. A mechanism M : X → R (meaning that, for every D ∈ X = n>0 X n , M(D) is an R-valued random variable) is said to provide ε-differential privacy for ε > 0 if, for every n ∈ N, for every pair (D, D ) ∈ X n × X n of databases differing in one entry only (henceforth denoted by D ∼ D ), and for every measurable
By limiting the influence of data on the induced response distribution, a powerful adversary (with knowledge of all but one input datum, the mechanism up to random source, and unbounded computation) cannot effectively identify an unknown input datum from mechanism responses. The Laplace mechanism [10] is a generic tool for differential privacy: adding zero-mean Laplace noise 1 to a vector-valued function provides privacy if the noise is calibrated to the function's sensitivity.
Definition 4 ([10]
). The sensitivity of a function f :
where the supremum is taken over all D, D ∈ X n that differ in one entry only. The sensitivity of a function F : X n × Y → R d is defined as S(F ) = sup y∈Y S(F (·, y)).
Lemma 1 ([10]
). Let f : X n → R d be a non-private function of finite sensitivity, and let Y ∼ Lap(S(f )/ε) d . Then, the random functionf (D) = f (D) + Y provides ε-differential privacy.
Given a mechanism, we measure its accuracy as follows. Definition 5. Let F : X n × Y → R. A mechanism M is (α, β)-accurate with respect to F D if for any database D ∈ X n and A = M(D), with probability at least 1 − β over the randomness of M, sup y∈Y |A(y) − F D (y)| ≤ α.
The Bernstein mechanism
In this section, we assume to be a constant and consider Y = [0, 1] . In Algorithm 1, we introduce a non-interactive and private mechanism for releasing F D : Y → R, a family of (γ, L)-Hölder continuous or (h, T )-smooth functions, parametrized by D ∈ X n . Algorithm 1 The Bernstein mechanism 1: Sanitization -Inputs: private dataset D ∈ X n ; sensitivity S(F ) and oracle access to target F 2: Parameters: cover size k, Bernstein order h positive integers; privacy budget ε > 0
Perturbation scale 5: For each p = (p 1 , . . . , p ) ∈ P : 6:
Main Theorem. Let , h, positive integers, 0 < γ ≤ 1, L > 0 and T > 0 be constants. Let X be an arbitrary space and Y = [0, 1] . Let furthermore F : X n × Y → R. For ε > 0, the Bernstein sanitization mechanism M provides ε-differential privacy. Moreover, for 0 < β < 1 the mechanism M is (α, β)-accurate if any of the following hold, where hidden constants depend on , L, γ, T, h.
(i) If F D is (γ, L)-Hölder continuous for every D ∈ X n , with error rate scaling as α =
Moreover, if 1/S(F ) ≤ poly(n, 1/ε), then the running-time of the mechanism and the running-time per evaluation are both polynomial in n and 1/ε.
The proof of this result is detailed in Section 4. The mechanism makes use of the iterated Bernstein polynomial of F D , which we introduce next (for a comprehensive survey refer to [16, 18] ). This approximation consists of a linear combination of so-called Bernstein basis polynomials, whose coefficients are evaluations of target F D on a cover.
We briefly introduce the univariate Bernstein basis polynomials and state some of their properties. Definition 6. Let k be a positive integer. The Bernstein basis polynomials of degree k are defined as
For every x ∈ [0, 1], any positive integer k and 0 ≤ ν ≤ k, we have b ν,k (x) ≥ 0 and k ν=0 b ν,k (x) = 1. In order to introduce the iterated Bernstein polynomials, we first need to recall the Bernstein operator. 
denotes the identity operator. The iterated Bernstein polynomial of order h can then be computed as:
We observe that B
(1)
Proof of the Main Theorem
To prove privacy we note that only the coefficients of the Bernstein polynomial of F D are sensitive and need to be protected. In order to provide ε-differential privacy, these coefficients-evaluations of target F D on a cover-are perturbed by means of Lemma 1. In this way, we can release the sanitized coefficients and use them for unlimited, efficient evaluation of the approximation of F D over Y, without further access to the data D. To establish utility, we separately analyze error due to the polynomial approximation of F D and error due to perturbation.
Unidimensional case ( = 1)
Let us fix k, a positive integer. As described in Algorithm 1, the Bernstein mechanism perturbs the evaluation of the function F D on a cover of the interval [0, 1]. Lemma 3. Let ε > 0. Then the Bernstein mechanism M provides ε-differential privacy.
The proof of Lemma 3 follows from an application of Lemma 1. We provide the full argument in Appendix B. In order to analyze the accuracy of our mechanism, we denote by B
ν,k (x) the iterated Bernstein polynomial of order h constructed using the coefficients output by the mechanism M. The error α introduced by the mechanism can be expressed as follows:
For every x ∈ [0, 1], the first summand in Equation (2) consists of the absolute value of an affine combination of independent Laplace-distributed random variables.
, δ ≥ 0, and C h be a constant depending on h only. Then:
Pr max
The proof of Proposition 4 follows from a result of Proschan [20] on the concentration of convex combinations of random variables drawn i.i.d from a log-concave symmetric distribution. For completeness, we give the full proof in Appendix C. Proposition 4 implies that with probability at least 1 − β the first summand in Equation (2) is bounded by O (S(F )k log(1/β)/ε). In order to bound the second summand we make use of the following convergence rates. 
According to the regularity of F D , the second summand in Equation (2) can then be bounded by a decreasing function g(k). All in all, the error in Equation (1) can be bounded as follows:
Since the second summand in Equation (3) is an increasing function in k, the optimal value for k (up to a constant factor) is achieved when k satisfies
Solving Equation (4) with the bounds for g(k) provided in Theorems 5 and 6 and substituting the thus obtained value of k into (3) prove the first two statements. The bound when F D is linear follows from the fact that for h = 1 and k = 1 the approximation error in Equation (2) is zero, since linear functions are fixed points of B
1 . The error is thus bounded by O (S(F ) log(1/β)/ε). The running time of the mechanism and the running time for answering a query is linear in k and hence upper bounded by a polynomial in n and 1/ε, if 1/S(F ) ≤ poly(n, 1/ε).
Multidimensional case ( > 1)
In order to extend the proof of the Main Theorem to > 1, we need to introduce the iterated Bernstein polynomial of a multivariate function f : [0, 1] → R.
Definition 9. Assume f : [0, 1] → R and let k 1 , . . . , k , h be positive integers. The (multivariate) iterated Bernstein polynomial of f (of order h) is defined as
For ease of exposition, we consider k 1 = . . . = k = k. By induction, it is possible to show that the approximation error of B (h) k can be bounded by g(k), if the error of the corresponding univariate polynomial is bounded by g(k). For completeness, we provide a proof in Appendix E. Moreover, note that the mechanism M now outputs a (k + 1) -dimensional vector, where each component is perturbed by Laplace-distributed noise with parameter λ = S(F )(k + 1) /ε. Privacy then follows immediately from Lemma 1. In order to conclude the error analysis, we observe that the error bound provided in Proposition 4 can be extended, too. 
The proof of Proposition 7 is provided in Appendix D. Following the same steps as in Section 4.1, the error α introduced by the mechanism can thus be bounded by
Solving g(k) = S(F )k log(1/β)/ε with the bounds for g(k) provided in Theorems 5 and 6 and substituting the thus obtained value of k into (5) give the first two statements of the Main Theorem. The bound for linear functions follows from the fact that the approximation error is zero for h = 1 and k = 1. The analysis of the running time of the mechanism and the running time for answering a query is straightforward and hence omitted.
Lower bound
In this section we present a lower bound on the error that any ε-differentially private mechanism approximating a function F : X n × Y → R must introduce.
Theorem 8. For ε > 0, there exists a function F : X n × Y → R such that the error that any ε-differentially private mechanism approximating F introduces is Ω (S(F )/ε), with high probability.
Proof. In order to prove Theorem 8, we consider X ⊂ [0, 1] to be a finite set and without loss of generality we view the database D as an element of X n or as an element of (Z + ) |X | , i.e. a histogram over the elements of X , interchangeably. We can then make use of a general result provided by De [8] .
If ∆ ≤ (s − 1)/ε, then any mechanism which is ε-differentially private for the query f on databases of size n introduces an error which is Ω(η), with high probability.
Therefore, we only need to show that there exist a suitable sequence of databases D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D 2 s , a function F : X n × Y → R and a y ∈ Y such that F (·, y) satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 9. We actually show that this holds for every y ∈ Y. Let ε > 0 and V be a non-negative integer. We define X = ({0, 1/(V + 8), 2/(V + 8), . . . , 1}) . Note that N = |X | = (V + 9) . Let furthermore c = 1/ε and n = V + c. The function F : X n × [0, 1] → R we consider is defined as follows:
where d i corresponds to the number of entries in D whose value is x i , for every x i ∈ X . For s = 3, we consider the sequence of databases D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D 8 , where, for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8}, d i ∈ D j is such that
We first observe that, for every j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8}, D j 1 = n. Moreover, for i = j, D i − D j 1 = 2c ≤ 2/ε. Finally, for i = j, |F (D i , y) − F (D j , y)| ≥ cη for every y ∈ [0, 1] . Since S(F ) = 7η, Proposition 9 implies that, with high probability, any ε-differentially private mechanism approximating F must introduce error Ω (S(F )/ε).
Examples
In this section, we demonstrate the versatility of the Bernstein mechanism through the analysis of a number of example learners. ·) is an (h, T )-smooth function for any positive integer h. Hence the error introduced by the mechanism is
with probability at least 1 − β. In Figure 1 we display the utility (averaged over 1000 repeats) of the Bernstein mechanism on 5000 points drawn from a mixture of two normal distributions N (0.5, 0.02) and N (0.75, 0.005) with weights 0.4, 0.6, respectively. Accuracy improves for increasing h, except for sufficiently large perturbations (very small ε) which affect approximations with larger derivatives (larger h) greater. Private cross validation [7, 6] can be used to tune h. We conclude noting that the same error bounds can be provided by the mechanism of Wang et al. [23] , since the function F H (D, ·) is separable in the training set D, i.e. F H (D, ·) = d∈D f H (d, ·). However, this assumption is overly restrictive for many applications. In the following, we discuss a few such cases and show how the Bernstein mechanism can still be successfully applied. . Without loss of generality, consider datasets D = ((d 1 , l 1 ), (d 2 , l 2 ), . . . , (d n , l n )) ∈ X n , where d 1 ≤ d 2 ≤ . . . ≤ d n , and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exists j = i such that |d i − d j | ≤ c/n, for a given (and publicly known) 0 < c ≤ n. Small values of c restrict the data space under consideration, whereas c = n corresponds to the general case D ∈ X n . For kernel K and bandwidth δ > 0, the Priestley-Chao kernel estimator [19, 2] is defined
Priestley
If K is the Gaussian kernel, then with probability at least 1 − β the error introduced by the mechanism can be bounded by In order to compute S(F ), we first observe that the sigmoid function is 1/4-Lipschitz. Denoting by w ∼ w the minimizers obtained from input databases D ∼ D , we have
where the last inequality follows from an application of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Chaudhuri et al. [5] showed sup w∼w w − w 2 ≤ 2C/n. Since y 2 ≤ √ for every y ∈ Y, we have S(F ) ≤ C √ /(2n). Since F D is an (h, T )-smooth function for any positive integer h, with probability at least 1 − β the error introduced by the mechanism is bounded by
We note that defining G D (y) = w , y the previous bound can be improved to
√ /n and G D (y) is a linear function. The prediction with the sigmoid function achieves the same error bound, being 1/4-Lipschitz.
Regularized empirical risk minimization. Let now X = [0, 1] , X = X × [0, 1] and Y = X. Let L be a convex and locally M -Lipschitz (in the first argument) loss function. For D = ((d 1 , l 1 ), (d 2 , l 2 ), . . . , (d n , l n )) ∈ X n , a regularized empirical risk minimization program with loss function L is defined as
where f w (x) = φ(x), w for a chosen feature mapping φ : X → R F taking points from X to some (possibly infinite) F -dimensional feature space and a hyperplane normal w ∈ R F . Let K(x, y) = φ(x), φ(y) be the kernel function induced by the feature mapping φ. The Representer Theorem [15] implies that the minimizer w lies in the span of the functions K(·, d i ) ∈ H, where H is a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS). Therefore, we consider F : X n × Y → R such that F D (y) = f w (y) = n i=1 α i l i K(y, d i ), for some α i ∈ R. An upper bound on the sensitivity of this function follows from an argument provided by Hall et al. [11] based on a technique of Bousquet and Elisseeff [3] . In particular, we have
If K is (2h, T )-smooth, the error introduced is bounded, with probability at least 1 − β, by
Note that this result holds with very mild assumptions, namely for any convex and locally M -Lipschitz loss function (e.g. square-loss, log-loss, hinge-loss) and any bounded kernel K. 
Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the setting of releasing functions of test data and privacy-sensitive training data. We have presented a simple yet effective mechanism for this general setting, that makes use of iterated Bernstein polynomials to approximate any regular function with perturbations applied to the resulting coefficients. Both ε-differential privacy and utility rates are proved in general for the mechanism, with corresponding lower bounds provided, and a number of example learners analyzed, demonstrating the Bernstein mechanism's versatility.
Although this is a classical result, we show for completeness that linear functions are fixed points of the Bernstein operator B k = B 
B Proof of Lemma 3
Let D ∈ X n be a second database differing from D in one entry only. Let furthermore ψ : X n → R k+1 be the map defined by
Then
According to Lemma 1 (applied with k + 1 in place of d), the mechanism M provides ε-differential privacy.
C Proof of Proposition 4
In order to prove the proposition, we make use of the following result. 
Then, for all δ ≥ 0
Choosing a 1 = 1 and a j = 0 for j = 2, . . . , m, Theorem 10 implies
for
We then observe that the density function h(y) = exp(−|y|/λ)/(2λ) of the Laplace distribution is symmetric and log-concave. If Y i ∼ Lap(λ) are i.i.d random variables for i = 1, . . . , m, the right-hand side of Equation (6) satisfies
Although the bases b
ν,k are not always positive for h ≥ 2, we observe that, for
ν,k (x)| have the same distribution, since the random variables Y ν are i.i.d. and symmetric around zero. We can thus restrict our analysis to Z (x). For
ν,k (x)|. We first note that
According to Equations (6) and (7), for every x ∈ [0, 1] and δ ≥ 0 we have
Choosing δ = U (x)δ , we get
for every x ∈ [0, 1], concluding the proof.
D Proof of Proposition 7
The proof of the proposition follows from the same argument provided in Appendix C, with some minor changes. In particular, it suffices to provide a tail bound for
νi,k (x i ) , since, as observed in Appendix C, the random variables Y νj are i.i.d. and symmetric around zero. In order to apply Theorem 10 and conclude the proof, we need to upper bound
for every x ∈ [0, 1] . We have
since, according to Equation (8),
νj ,k (x j ) ≤ (2 h − 1) for every j ∈ {1, . . . , }. The rest of the proof follows from the same computations done at the end of Appendix C.
E Approximation error of multivariate Bernstein polynomials
In what follows, we assume that f : [0, 1] → R is a (γ, L)-Hölder continuous function. The proof for (h, T )-smooth functions follows the same argument, with minor changes. The argument we present here is by induction on . The base case ( = 1) follows from the fact that the Bernstein polynomial 
